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Tom Allbeson 
‘Where are the pictures?’ 
Photography & British Public Perception of 
the Bombing of Germany, 1941–45
Abstract 
This article examines the relationship between the photographically-illustrated press and 
the government vis-à-vis the bombing of Germany during the Second World War. It will look 
at publications issued by the Ministry of Information, such as Bomber Command (1941) and 
Bomber Command Continues (1942), which sought to shape public perceptions of the campaign, 
as well as the depiction in Picture Post (the most widely circulating photo-magazine of the 
period) of this aspect of the British war effort following the escalation of the air offensive 
from 1942 onwards. This research addresses photography as a key facet of the British govern-
ment’s interaction with the press, taking the MOI photo-books and Picture Post as illustrative 
case studies in the public presentation of the bombing campaign. SpeciÀcally, this article 
considers the production, management and presentation of photographic depictions of the 
results of aerial bombardment to propose a disjunction in wartime Britain between public 
knowledge of Bomber Command’s actions and public understanding of the consequences of 
this campaign. These case studies illuminate ways in which the contemporary Àeld of public 
relations so prevalent in liberal democracies of the twenty-Àrst century—mediating between 
governments and publics via the press—took shape during the Second World War in Britain. 
Introduction
In 2012, a memorial to the 55,573 members of Bomber Command who lost their lives during 
the Second World War was unveiled in London’s Green Park. That this memorial was only cre-
ated nearly 70 years after the end of the war is testament to the debates about the efÀcacy 
and morality of the Allied bombing campaign that claimed the lives of an estimated 410,000 
Germans, 60,000 French and others in occupied Europe.1 The purpose of this article is not to 
pass judgement on the strategic or ethical issues regarding the bomber offensive, however, 
nor to trace the evolving debate on this issue over the decades. Rather, it will look at knowl-
edge and understanding by the British public of Bomber Command’s campaign between 1941 
and 1945. An analysis of the photographic representation in both ofÀcial publications and 
photo-magazines reveals that many of the tensions which characterise debate about Bomber 
Command today were present in wartime. Moreover, such an analysis prompts broader reÁec-
tion on the interaction of government, military and the press in wartime.
The historiography of Bomber Command’s involvement in the bombing of Germany suggests 
at least two alternative analyses of the British public’s awareness of the air offensive. Philip 
M. Taylor, for instance, asserted that ‘perhaps the greatest single achievement of any ser-
vice department’s publicity unit during the war’ was the concealment from the British of 
the aims and impact of the bombing campaign.2 Mark Connelly, however, argues that the 
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Süss, Death from the Skies: How the British and Germans Survived Bombing in 
World War II, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, 93–99. 
4. Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of 
Information in World War II, London: George Allen & Unwin 1979, 166.
3. Mark Connelly, ‘The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air Campaign 
against Germany, 1939–1945,’ Contemporary British History, 16:2 (2002), 39–58. 
See also, Andrew Knapp, ‘The Allied Bombing Offensive in the British Media, 
1942–45’, in: Andrew Knapp and Hilary Footitt (eds.), Liberal Democracies at 
War: Con²ict and Representation, London: Bloomsbury 2013, 39–66; and Dietmar 
aims—although not always explicitly stated—were broadly known and supported by the pub-
lic.3 Despite appearances, these different perspectives are neither diametrically opposed nor 
irreconcilable. As Ian McLaine observed in his history of the Ministry of Information (MOI), 
there was an attempt by arms of government to mislead the public, but the public were none-
theless aware of the campaign and its targets—a situation that amounted to ‘a tacit conspir-
acy to pretend that Britain declined to use the methods of total war.’4 This article addresses 
the disjunction between the publicly-circulating representations of Bomber Command and 
the reality of its changing capacities and results over the war; that is, it addresses the image 
of Bomber Command in wartime. 
The concept of ‘image’ is ambiguous, albeit ubiquitous in contemporary culture. Image im-
plies reputation, but it also contains within it a sense of the superÀciality of appearance. To 
talk of the image of an organisation or an individual is at one and the same time to suggest 
that the ideas associated with that subject are based on the look of things, not necessarily the 
nature of things. The image of an organisation or person admits of inconsistencies, impres-
sions and emotion, as much as clarity, evidence and rationality. The idea of an organisation’s 
image encompasses both its own managed presentation to a public and the public’s attitude 
to that organisation informed by representations beyond the subject’s control. As such, im-
age sits uneasily or ambiguously between notions of representation and reception. It implies 
a shared idea that is somewhat fragile or insubstantial. Of course, image also suggests the 
heavy reliance on visual representations of such issues of public perception and reputation. 
Indeed, it points to the trafÀc between physical representations in public (like photographs 
in the press) and private mental representations (pictures in the mind’s eye). In his 1922 book, 
Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann highlighted reliance of the public on the media to form the 
pictures in in our heads that enable us to understand and navigate the world around us.5
Thus, the notion of image is not simply a Àgure of speech. Nor is it a twenty-Àrst century 
phenomenon. It is a facet of modern culture that has a historic development and has been 
inÁuential in contemporary history. Image is a concept as equally relevant to propaganda as 
public relations. Indeed, it highlights the interplay between the two Àelds which is at the cen-
tre of this research. Bomber Command is an important and illuminating case study regarding 
the historical problem of image: It allows us to reÁect on the growing importance of visual 
media and public relations during the twentieth century’s most destructive conÁict. 
As evident in remarks by the Controller of the News and Censorship Division at the MOI, war-
time brought the realisation that ‘photographs were one of the most potent instruments of 
war-time information’: ‘The really superb picture […] could have the same effect upon public 
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7. Jo Fox, ‘The Propaganda War,’ in: R.J.B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2015, vol. 2, 91–116 (100).
8. Mark Connelly, Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in 
World War II, London: I. B. Tauris 2002, 8. 
9. Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient 
World to the Present Day, 3rd ed., Manchester: Manchester University Press 
2003, 216.
10. For more detailed discussion of the bombing war in Europe, see Richard 
Overy, The Bombing War: Europe, 1939–1945, London: Allen Lane 2013.
5. ‘The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting 
for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, 
so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. And although we 
have to act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model 
before we can manage with it. […] What each man does is based not on direct 
and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him,’ Walter 
Lippmann, in: Public Opinion, New York: Macmillan 1922, 16 & 25. 
6. Francis Williams, Press, Parliament and People, London: Heinemann 1946, 
215–216. 
opinion abroad as a great victory.’6 Photography was central to that crucial wartime propa-
ganda effort that Jo Fox characterised as ‘shaping perception and manipulating information.’7
Yet, while Connelly and others have addressed the importance of Àlm and cinema-going to 
British wartime reporting of Bomber Command operations, the equally prevalent medium of 
photography has been considered in much less detail.8 Analysing publications co-produced 
by the Air Ministry and the MOI, as well as coverage of the bombing offensive in Picture Post 
(the most widely-circulating photo-magazine of the period), the scope of this enquiry encom-
passes ofÀcial publications up to 1942 (a key moment in the escalation of the bombing offen-
sive against Germany) and press coverage up to the cessation of area bombing in April 1945. I 
consider the role of photographic imagery in shaping the public image of Bomber Command 
reÁecting on the trafÀc between images on the page with the public knowledge and under-
standing of the aims and impact of the bombing campaign. These publications raise par-
ticular questions about the role that photography played in government relations with the 
press industry in wartime and beyond. What sort of photographic imagery was circulating in 
relation to Bomber Command? How did this visual material (encompassing aerial photos and 
photo stories about both aircrews and aircraft production) frame the bombing offensive for 
the public? What was the context in which were made the military decisions to release and 
the editorial decision to publish this visual material? What conclusions can be drawn from 
an analysis of the publicly-circulating photography about the image of Bomber Command 
during the war? 
In short, a careful study of the role of photography in shaping the image of Bomber Command 
in ofÀcial publications and the mainstream media suggests that the absence of imagery ena-
bling Britons to appreciate the impact of the campaign meant that public knowledge and pub-
lic understanding need to be considered as two separate issues. Even though the public may 
well have known what was being done, they could not adequately conceive what this meant 
on the ground. Taylor has asserted that ‘Propaganda […] is as much about what is not said as 
overt expression.’9 The same is true in the Àeld of visual culture and public relations; the im-
age of an organisation depends as much on what is not seen as what is.
The development of British bombing policy
It is instructive to outline brieÁy the strategic and policy background before analysing how 
Bomber Command was presented in ofÀcial publications during the early years of the war.10
Bombing of civilian populations having already been experienced during the First World 
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16. Cited in Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939–1945: Organisations, 
Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
1979, 201. Regarding public appetite for reprisals, see Tom Harrisson, ‘A Public 
demand for reprisals?’, in: Cambridge Review, 30 May 1941, 454–456, and Brett 
Holman, ‘“Bomb Back, and Bomb Hard”: Debating Reprisals during the Blitz’, 
in: Australian Journal of Politics & History, 58:3 (2012), 394–407.
17. This directive and others are reproduced in the official four-volume his-
tory of the campaign: Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air 
Offensive against Germany, 1939–1945, London: H.M.S.O., vol. 4, 1961, 128–129.
18. Webster, Frankland 1961 (reference 17), 136–137. 
11. Regarding the apprehension of aerial warfare, see Brett Holman, The Next 
War in the Air: Britain’s Fear of the Bomber, 1908–1941, Farnham: Ashgate 2014. 
Regarding the faith in technology, see Edgerton 1992 (reference 2). 
12. Reported in The Times, 11 November 1932, 7.
13. Richard Overy, ‘Making and Breaking Morale: British Political Warfare 
and Bomber Command in the Second World War’, in: Twentieth-Century British 
History, 26:3 (2015), 370–399 (374).
14. Martin Farr, ‘The Labour Party and Strategic Bombing in the Second World 
War’, in: Labour History Review, 77:1 (2012), 133–153 (136).
15. Terence H. O’Brien, Civil Defence, London: H.M.S.O. 1955, 677.
War, the use of aircraft in conÁict situations was much debated in the interwar period. In 
Britain, the prevailing attitude was one of apprehension regarding an attack on Britain, but 
this sat alongside a belief in the technological capacities of the bomber as a weapon of attack 
for Britain.11 This viewpoint was summed up in Stanley Baldwin’s famous phrase, ‘The bomber 
will always get through.’ In line with military strategists across the continent, Baldwin ar-
gued: ‘The only defence is in offence, which means that you have got to kill more women and 
children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves. I mention that so that 
people may realize what is waiting for them when the next war comes.’12 While there were 
differing opinions over the most effective target (civilians or infrastructure), the demand for 
preparedness was common and, in 1936, Bomber Command was established. 
On 3 September 1939, the day Britain declared war, Bomber Command was issued with orders 
to drop 8m leaÁets on the German population.13 On 10 May 1940, Churchill formed a coali-
tion wartime government and on the night of 11/12 May the bombing of Germany began.14 In 
September 1940, following British bombing of Berlin in August, the Blitz on Britain started in 
earnest. In the period up to 31 December 1940, 22,069 British civilians were killed by bomb-
ing and a further 19,918 were killed in 1941.15 That year, unsurprisingly there was evidence 
of a hardening of attitudes in Britain regarding the bombing of Germany. In March 1941, a 
Home Intelligence report conducted by Mass Observation for the MOI claimed that, ‘people 
will want a lot of convincing that really heavy raids on civilian centres in Germany are not 
our most efÀcacious weapon.’16
A debate taking place within the Air Ministry and the cabinet’s Defence Committee over this 
period was to move policy decisively away from a restricted focus on military targets. As 
early as 30 October 1940, Bomber Command had been told to direct their efforts not only at 
the enemy’s oil industry, but also at their morale through ‘regular concentrated attacks […] 
with the primary aim of causing very heavy material destruction which will demonstrate to 
the enemy the power and severity of air bombardment.’17 A revised directive of 9 July 1941 
articulated the dual priority as ‘dislocating the German transport system and […] destroying 
the morale of the civil population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular.’18
Simultaneously, considerable effort was expended on ascertaining the accuracy and impact 
of the bombing campaign. Contested though it was, the Butt Report of 18 August 1941 was an 
important part of the development of policy. Based on the analysis of 650 photographs made 
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of this strategy (‘Extract from the Report by the Police President of Hamburg 
on the raids on Hamburg in July and August 1943, dated 1st December 1943’, 
in: Webster & Frankland 1961 (reference 17), 4, 310-315). Harris claimed (on 
the basis that the policy could reduce the number of Allied combatant deaths) 
that, ‘In spite of all that happened at Hamburg, bombing proved a comparatively 
humane method’ (Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive, London: Collins, 1947, 176).
24. Overy 2012 (reference 20), 25 & 27.
25. Harris 1947 (reference 23), 149. 
26. Harris 1947 (reference 23), 149.
19. On the Butt Report and its relative importance, see Overy (reference 10), 
267–269. The report is reproduced in Webster and Frankland1961 (reference 
17), vol. 4, 205–213.
20. Richard Overy, ‘The Weak Link? The Perception of the German Working 
Class by RAF Bomber Command, 1940-1945’, in: Labour History Review, 77:1 
(2012), 1–33 (22).
21. Süss 2014 (reference 3), 248.
22. Webster and Frankland1961 (reference 17), 144.
23. An appendix in the official history gives a graphic account of the ramifications 
by automatic cameras Àtted to bombers during 100 raids between 2 June and 25 July 1941, the 
report suggested that as many as one-third of the aircraft failed to locate the target, while 
of the remaining aircraft only one in three had dropped their bombs within Àve miles of the 
aiming point. The report made clear that precision bombing was at this point more myth 
than reality.19 Also central to the on-going revision of policy was the conviction that target-
ing workers and their houses was an effective means of disrupting the enemy’s war effort. As 
Overy observes, in the summer of 1941 research was underway to determine the most effec-
tive bombing strategy to cause the maximum amount of damage.20 These Àndings too were 
contested. Nonetheless, this combined research represents the signiÀcant shift in policy that 
took place in 1941. 
The directive issued to Bomber Command on 14 February 1942 reÁected what Dietmar Süss 
termed ‘the radicalization of the air war.’21 It reformulated the target of Bomber Command’s 
missions as follows: ‘the primary object of your operations should now be focused on the mo-
rale of the enemy civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers.’22 Sir Arthur 
Harris was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command a week later. By this point, 
the Command was already set on a course that amounted to a policy of ‘de-housing’ industrial 
workers. This was to be achieved using incendiary bombs to destroy the largest area of urban 
spaces as possible.23 The results of Bomber Command in achieving this end were appraised 
on the basis of estimates of the total acreage of urban space destroyed. These estimates were 
calculated on the evidence of aerial reconnaissance photographs.24 In his memoirs, Harris 
extolled the value of this imagery in convincing ‘the people who mattered.’25 Harris had large 
format aerial photographs, marked with blue paint to identify destroyed areas, compiled into 
books. The ‘blue book’ was complemented by stereoscopic images viewed through replica ste-
reopticons that Harris had specially made based on a Victorian example. In stereoscopic im-
ages, Harris enthused, ‘air raid damage shows up to an extent that would hardly be believed 
by those who have only seen ordinary photographs.’26
The development of policy and the build-up of the capacities of Bomber Command can be 
traced in the milestone British raids of the war, such as Lübeck (April 1942), Cologne (May 
1942), Essen and Bremen (June 1942), Hamburg (July 1943), Berlin (November 1943 to March 
1944) and Dresden (February 1945). While in May 1940, the RAF dropped 1,668 tons of bombs 
on Germany, at the peak of the offensive in March 1945 it dropped 67,637 tons. Indeed, ‘In 
March 1945, the quantity of British and American bombs dropped on Germany was three 
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29. Overy 2012 (reference 20), 32. 
30. Bomber Command – The Air Ministry’s Account of Bomber Command’s Offensive 
against the Axis: September, 1939 – July, 1941, London: H.M.S.O. 1941.
31. Valerie Holman, ‘Carefully Concealed Connections: The Ministry of Information 
and British Publishing, 1939–1946’, in: Book History, 8 (2005), 197–226 (213).
32. Holman notes that paper rationing began on 3 March 1940 with shortages at 
their worst at the start of 1942, in: Holman 2005 (reference 31), 212).
27. Farr 2012 (reference 14), 148. In 1943, following the Casablanca Conference, 
the notion of a Combined Bomber Offensive was mooted, but as Childers notes, 
in reality, the US and UK bombing campaigns were really ‘two distinct, parallel 
efforts,’ Thomas Childers, ‘“Facilis descensus averni est”: The Allied Bombing 
of Germany and the Issue of German Suffering’, in: Central European History, 
38:1 (2005), 75–105 (92).
28. Overy 2012 (reference 20), 32.
times the total of those dropped on Britain in the entire war.’27 In major 
cities, half of the urban environment was destroyed while—along with 
70,000 forced labourers—the majority of the 410,000 Germans killed were 
from the working class.28 The policy of area bombing remains at the centre 
of debates about the efÀcacy and morality of the bombing campaign today. 
Following the radicalisation of bombing policy, no ofÀcial effort was made 
to clarify the objectives of Bomber Command for the public. As Overy 
makes evident, ‘the systematic and progressive obliteration of work-
ers and their housing became the preferred approach to undermining 
the German war economy, even though the British wartime authorities 
publicly denied throughout the war that Bomber Command was attack-
ing anything other than legitimate military targets.’29 Indeed, as a result 
of concerns about negative reactions, the lack of clarity was maintained 
through the management of the visual material that was available to the 
press (e.g. photo-essays about aircraft production) and that was not (i.e. visual representa-
tions of the destruction of German residential districts). While debate about strategy did sur-
face in the media, the public understanding of the terms of the debate was limited by, on the 
one hand, a paucity of photographic coverage of the impact of the offensive and, on the other, 
the image of Bomber Command was forged at the start of the war. The latter is discussed in 
the following section.  
Precision and perception: Official publications to 1942 
The MOI produced two publications sponsored by the Air Ministry detailing the work 
of Bomber Command. The Àrst, published in 1941, was Bomber Command (Àg. 1).30 This was 
amongst the most popular of the many ofÀcial war books produced by the MOI during the 
conÁict to meet its aim of presenting the Allied war effort to audiences at home and abroad. 
As Valerie Holman observes, ‘To reach a vast readership a new kind of book was needed.’31 The 
importance placed on these publications is evident in the allocation of paper towards the ini-
tiative at a time of rationing.32 According to Robert Fraser, Head of the Publications Division 
of the MOI, photographs were the central element of this successful format: 
It must, above all, use pictures. Indeed, it must so use pictures as to become two books 
in one—a picture book and a text book—and it must carry the full propaganda message 
once in the text and for a second time in the pictures and captions which together must 
Figure 1
Unknown photographer, 
cover of: Bomber Command – The Air Ministry’s 
Account of Bomber Command’s Offensive against 
the Axis: September, 1939 – July, 1941, 
London: H.M.S.O. 1941.
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35. By analysing these representations, I do not wish simply to assert that 
these implications are untrue in relation to specific individuals. Rather, I aim to 
analyse how the public image of Bomber Command as a whole was constructed 
using such imagery. Through these photographs, personal qualities such as 
bravery or loyalty are transferred from individuals to the organisation as a 
whole and to its activities. By way of contrast to this analysis of official visual 
strategies of representing Bomber Command, see Houghton’s discussion of 
Bomber Command members own memoirs (Frances Houghton, ‘“Writing the 
‘Missing Chapter”: Post-War Memoirs of Bomber Command Aircrew’, in: Lucy 
Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (eds.), British Cultural Memory and the Second 
World War, London: Bloomsbury 2013, 155–174).
33. Cited by Holman 2005 (reference 31), 213. The comment comes from a 
report titled ‘Books and Pamphlets Programme’ and dated 4 December 1941 
(National Archives, London, INF 1/123).
34. Louis Moss and Kathleen Box, ‘Ministry of Information Publications: A 
Study of Public Attitudes towards Six Ministry of Information Books, June – July 
1943’, National Archives, RG 24/32, 2. This report, (based on feedback from 
5,895 civilians) suggested that over half of the population had seen one of the 
MOI photo-books, while a quarter had seen three or more (p. 3). The authors 
estimated that over 10m people had potentially seen a copy of one or other of 
the official publications concerning Bomber Command (p. 17).
tell the continuous story to those who will not read the 
text. It seems that when these qualities are added to a 
good manuscript which has the status of being ofÀcial, 
propaganda best sellers can be created.33
And so they were. The format decided upon (usually 
measuring 23 x 16,5 cm and always photographically-
illustrated) proved very popular, with nine titles sell-
ing in excess of one million copies.
A substantial publication running to 128 pages, Bomber 
Command included nearly 90 photographs. Allocated 4.5 
tons of paper, it had sold 1,360,000 copies by the summer 
of 1943.34 The cover depicts eight men under the wing 
of an aircraft (possibly a Stirling from 139 Squadron). 
Figure 2 is a double-page spread the photographs in which establish a sense of professional-
ism and camaraderie, as well as the impression of considered response. The image of the log of 
the Àrst wartime sortie (a reconnaissance mission) suggests measured and deliberate activity, 
through its implications of research, reÁection and record-keeping. The caption to the image 
of the aircrew reads: ‘Captain and crew form a team upon whose close co-ordination the suc-
cess of every Áight depends.’ On the following page, a photograph of the pilot and second pilot 
carries a quotation from the text as caption: ‘Brave yet cautious, cool yet daring.’ A substantial 
chapter of the book, (‘The Crew that Strikes’) covers this team in more detail.35 Another chap-
ter addresses the image of those on the ground involved in questions of intelligence and strat-
egy. The team are depicted observing maps and reconnaissance photographs, receiving calls 
and recording information. This tableau, reminiscent today of countless war Àlms, effectively 
conveys a sense of reassuring precision and seriousness to substantiate the ideas of considered 
action implied by the chapter title, ‘The Mind that Plans.’ On another page, a photograph of the 
Commander-in-Chief carries these same words as a caption. 
Discussing Àlms of the period, Edgerton notes how such representations play on ‘national 
stereotypes, which are implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, connected to a broader picture 
of England: as a nation which is attacked, not a nation which attacks; as a lethargic nation 
Figure 2
Unknown photographer, 
double page in: Bomber Command – The Air 
Ministry’s Account of Bomber Command’s Offen-
sive against the Axis: September, 1939 – July, 1941, 
London: H.M.S.O. 1941, 8–9.
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38. Harry Watt & Paul Holt, Target for Tonight: The Record in Text and Pictures of 
a Bombing Raid on Germany, London: Hutchison & Co. 1941.
36. Edgerton 1992 (reference 2), 61
37. Target for Tonight (dir. Harry Watt), Crown Film Unit UK 1941. 
raised to genius by emergency, and saved by heroic, 
aristocratic pilots and shy bofÀns.’36 Bomber Command il-
lustrates how these stereotypes were operative across 
a number of cultural formats, not just Àlm. Moreover, 
this publication shows the manner in which photog-
raphy played a vital supporting role alongside Àlm. 
Explicit references are included in the MOI photo-book 
to a 1941 documentary-style Àlm, Target for Tonight.37
The Àlm (in which RAF members played themselves) 
told the story of the crew of bomber ‘F for Freddie’ on a 
sortie over Germany. Not only is the Àlm’s title phrase 
used in Bomber Command, but so are stills from the Àlm. 
The MOI publication thus provides a prolongation of the 
Àlm experience beyond the space of the cinema and 
the duration of the screening; it extends the spectacle 
into domestic spaces and spaces of working life where 
the booklet would be viewed and commented upon. 
Likewise, a booklet of the Àlm was produced by a commercial publisher featuring stills and a 
narrativisation of the on-screen action written by Paul Holt of the Daily Express (Àg. 3).38
Film, photo-book and spin-off booklet all depict the importance of photography to the war 
effort. The Àlm begins with the dropping of a package from an aircraft (also depicted in the 
double-page spread from the booklet). The package is then taken into a bunker through a door 
marked ‘Photographic Section – Bomber Command – Secret.’ Here, the negatives of aerial 
images from the package are developed and discussed, kick-starting the rest of the Àlm’s nar-
rative. The MOI publication in turn devotes considerable space to reproducing and discussing 
aerial imagery. The copywriter reÁects on the issue of interpreting photographs of bomb 
damage as follows: 
Though it is said that the camera cannot lie, it often does not reveal the whole truth. A 
bomb may wreak havoc in a building but make only a small hole in its roof, and this is 
all that appears on the photograph. […] Large-scale vertical photographs reveal what 
remains of the buildings as stark skeletons composed of uncovered walls and naked sup-
ports; but the bursting of high explosive bombs in streets or in houses can create im-
mense damage to the roadway and façade of the buildings, while leaving the roofs them-
selves more or less intact. [… In aerial shots] The long shadows caused by the houses in 
Figure 3
Unknown photographer, ‘Target for Tonight’, 
in: Harry Watt & Paul Holt, Target for Tonight, 
London: Hutchison & Co. 1941, 4–5. 
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members of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, see Constance Babington 
Smith, Evidence in Camera: The Story of Photographic Intelligence in the Second 
World War, London: Chatto & Windus 1957; and Ursula Powys-Lybbe, The Eye of 
Intelligence, London: William Kimber 1983. 
39. Bomber Command (reference 30), 115 & 117.
40. This too is a potential link back to the film in which the Squadron Leader 
examines the reconnaissance photographs with a magnifying glass. In ac-
tuality, these images were often viewed with a stereoscope. For memoirs of 
the narrow streets preclude detailed interpretation, by any but an expert, 
of the damage which does in fact exist; and this should be borne in mind 
when inspecting the air photographs published in the Press.39
The experience of looking at the photographs reproduced in Bomber 
Command is a very directed form of visual experience as a result of the 
accompanying text and captions. The reader/viewer is being exhorted to 
look and to see, but at the same time is being told that only experts can 
appropriately interpret for them what they are seeing. A photomontage 
supports this interpretation of photographic material (Àg. 4) combining 
a marked-up aerial photograph and a superimposed magnifying glass.40 Such direction is 
also evident on the following pages which contain two pairs of photographs captioned with 
a warning: ‘Air photos may deceive’ (Àg. 5). The examples illustrating this dictum (both from 
Berlin) each comprise a street view and an aerial view. The captions emphasise the value of 
the former over the latter in showing damage. 
Arguably, the ambiguity apportioned to the aerial image is also strongly evident in the text. 
That is, the damage discussed and depicted raises questions about the target and the effects 
of the bombing campaign. When depicting a raid earlier in the photo-book, the focus is on 
Figure 4
Unknown photographer, Arial view, 
in: Bomber Command – The Air Ministry’s Account 
of Bomber Command’s Offensive against the Axis: 
September, 1939 – July, 1941, 
London: H.M.S.O. 1941, 116.
Figure 5
Unknown photographer, ‘Air photos may 
deceive’, in: Bomber Command – The Air Ministry’s 
Account of Bomber Command’s Offensive against 
the Axis: September, 1939 – July, 1941, 
London: H.M.S.O. 1941, 120–121. 
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42. Bomber Command Continues – The Air Ministry’s Account of the Rising 
Offensive against Germany: July 1941 – June 1942, London: H.M.S.O. 1942. This 
publication had sold 505,000 copies by summer 1943 (Moss and Box, National 
Archives, RG23/42, 2).
41. Bomber Command (reference 30), 122.
military and transportation targets. When discussing the issue of interpreting photography, 
however, the text refers to high explosives in houses, while the street view photographs ap-
pear to show destruction of a potter’s workshop and a pub in Schulzendorfer Strasse, Berlin, 
as well as other residential areas in Invaliden Strasse, Berlin. The aerial photographs along-
side are marked with military or industrial targets, but the pairing of photographs and their 
discussion in the text clearly show that bombing raids create widespread destruction; they 
do not amount to precision bombing.  
 Notwithstanding such ambiguity, when the author turned to the issue, viewers of these im-
ages and readers of the accompanying text could be left in little doubt about what the contin-
ued offensive would mean in Germany: 
What, however, has been the effect of our raids on the morale of the Germans? The im-
portance of this aspect of our bombing attacks on them needs no emphasis. As soon as 
German morale begins to wilt, victory will be in sight. […] The third and present phase, 
in which our attacks have assumed a more concentrated form, is producing a feeling of 
nervousness and apprehension at the increasing weight of the assault.41
The Ànal two images of aircraft are captioned ‘Growing Might’ and ‘Growing Mastery’ clearly 
implying the increasing ferocity of the campaign. And it was explicit in the follow-up publica-
tion issued in 1942. 
Although a smaller, shorter and less lavishly illustrated publication, Bomber Command Continues
adumbrates the ‘rising offensive’ in the Ànal chapters: ‘The Hammer Falls: One Thousand 
Bombers over Cologne’ and ‘The Blow Strikes Home.’42 This later chapter title (with its refer-
ence to ‘home’), whether intentionally or not, points to the many houses of German civilians 
that were being destroyed by the offensive. However, the images in this later publication do 
not depict this. Notwithstanding the earlier ofÀcial proclamation about the value of the street 
view photograph, none are reproduced in this follow-up booklet. Instead, examples of some of 
the hard-to-read aerial images discussed in the previous publication are deployed, including 
one of Lübeck which clearly shows the whole town severely damaged and not just harbours 
or factories. Indeed, this smaller publication includes only 11 photographs. Alongside aerial 
images are photographs of aircraft and crews, as well as considerable imagery of aircraft 
production. Thus, while the text describes the raids, the choice of accompanying photographs 
deliberately focuses on the stereotypical image of the aircrew and the hard-working experts 
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the bombing campaign. This was acknowledged in the MOI photo-book: ‘The 
main source of information about damage are photographs and reports of all 
kinds, from statements made in the enemy and neutral press and radio to the 
tales of returned travellers', in: Bomber Command, 115. See also Knapp 2013 
(reference 3), 42.
46. Regarding the development of the system of press oversight, see Taylor 
1999 (reference 2), 153–175, and Nicholas Wilkinson, Secrecy and the Media: The 
Of±cial History of the United Kingdom’s D-Notice System, Abingdon: Routledge 
2009, 169–196.
47. This division was overseen by Francis Williams, Editor of the Daily Herald in 
1939 before becoming an MOI Advisor on Press Relations and then Controller 
of the News and Censorship Division from 1941, Williams exemplifies the fact 
43. Bomber Command Continues (reference 42), 56.
44. There were two subsequent H.M.S.O. publications in 1944 regarding the in-
volvement of other Allied nationals in the bombing campaign against Germany: 
Target Germany: The U.S. Army Air Forces’ Of±cial Story of the VIII Bomber 
Command’s First Year over Europe, London: H.M.S.O. 1944; There’s Freedom in 
the Air: The Of±cial Story of the Allied Air Forces from the Occupied Countries, 
London: H.M.S.O. 1944. The latter was written by novelist H. E. Bates, who 
worked at the Air Ministry Publications Directorate (F.C. Gillman, ‘Public 
Relations in the United Kingdom prior to 1948’, in: International Public Relations 
Association Review, April 1978, 49).
45. The monitoring of the foreign press conducted throughout the war would 
have been a potential source of additional imagery to illustrate coverage of 
who support them. The value of selecting imagery of this type is evident and parallels the 
direction issued to the viewer of aerial photographs. It focuses attention on aspects of the 
campaign that take place in Britain (production, planning and preparation) rather than those 
taking place in Germany (loss of aircraft and crew, destruction of homes, death of civilians). 
Intriguingly, the Ànal lines in Bomber Command Continues (which covered the period to June 
1942) stated that, ‘This is an interim report.’43 However, there was no subsequent ofÀcial pub-
lication publicising the work of Bomber Command.44
Censorship and public relations
As well as analysis of the printed page and the way text and photograph together frame sub-
ject matter in these ofÀcial publications, to ascertain the means by which the public image 
of Bomber Command was constructed it is also necessary to reÁect on the restrictions and 
procedures put in place by arms of government to manage the circulation of news images.
The sorts of street view photograph advocated in 1941 remained largely absent throughout 
the conÁict. War, disrupting international networks, imposes limitations on the circulation 
of goods across national borders including photographs. No doubt, there were practical is-
sues that inÁuenced the depiction in Britain of the effects of the bombing of Germany. These 
limitations alone, however, do not explain the lack of imagery depicting the impact of bomb-
ing in the wartime British press.45 As relevant as the challenge of sourcing such material was 
the sensitivity to public perceptions of Bomber Command both within the Air Ministry and 
the Ministry of Information. Going beyond the issuing of ofÀcial publications, a number of 
strategies were developed to address these concerns and manage the image of the bombing 
offensive. The Àrst was the organisation of censorship; the second, the deployment of public 
relations staff. 
The MOI was responsible for developing and implementing wartime censorship procedures, 
operating in collaboration with the various Armed Service Ministries and other govern-
ment departments.46 After initial strained relations between the press, the MOI and Service 
Ministries, a putatively voluntary arrangement became established whereby editors could 
submit items for review to the MOI Press and Censorship Division which they felt might be of 
military value to the enemy, thus contravening legal requirements on the press.47 National 
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Statutory Rules and Orders, London: H.M.S.O. 1940, vol. II, 916–917. 
50. Press and Censorship Bureau, Defence Notices, Revised Edition 1939, 3 
(National Archives, T 162/600); this edition was circulated in January 1940.
51. George P. Thomson, Blue Pencil Admiral: The Inside Story of Press Censorship, 
London: Sampson Low, Marston 1947, 176.
52. Harris 1947 (reference 23), 155–156.
53. Taylor 1999 (reference 2), 161.
that government public relations work drew heavily on press expertise and 
personnel. 
48. On the organisation of the Photographic Section, see Williams 1946 (refer-
ence 6), 215–218. 
49. These Control Orders were published by H.M.S.O.: ‘The Control of 
Photography Order (No. 1) [No. 1125, dated September 10, 1939]’ and ‘The 
Control of Photography Order (No. 2) [No. 1710, dated November 27, 1939]’, 
in: Statutory Rules and Orders, London: H.M.S.O. 1940, vol. I, 1171–1174; ‘The 
Control of Photography Order (No. 3) [No. 1297, dated July 12, 1940]’, in: 
security was established as the chief concern, the general principle being that facts were 
subject to censorship, but not opinion. The publication in the press of photographs of war-
time Britain (including not only damage from the Blitz, but also Bomber Command per-
sonnel at bases in the UK) came under this ‘voluntary’ system. Censorship of photography 
was the responsibility of the Photographic Section of the Ministry’s Press and Censorship 
Division, led by Hugh Francis.48 Photography was the subject of a Control Order issued under 
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939.49 These Control Orders were also supported by 
a pamphlet compiling the relevant Defence Notices circulated to the press as guidance for 
them regards operating under this system. These D-Notices indicated issues ‘where publica-
tion without previous submission to censorship is considered likely to prove dangerous to 
the national security.’50
It seems likely that the threat of government action and the weight of arguments about na-
tional security were both relevant to the press handling of photography, precipitating in-
stances of self-censorship that determined the stories covered and the viewpoints published 
in wartime. Certainly, the Chief Censor at the MOI felt justiÀed in remarking approvingly 
after the war that an editor’s ‘Àrst consideration was to avoid giving information of value 
to the enemy.’51 Harris—frequently critical of the press—was fulsome in his praise for the 
Daily Telegraph: ‘Among my many visitors I must especially recall Lord Camrose of the Daily 
Telegraph. […] without his support and that of the Daily Telegraph life would have been much 
more difÀcult than it was; and it was difÀcult and wearing enough.’52 In addition to both the 
threat of censorship and self-censorship, however, historians of photography must also reck-
on with the MOI involvement in overseeing news coming from outside of the UK. News coming 
through commercial cable networks had Àrst to pass through a point of entry overseen by the 
Ministry of Information, the result being a process of review that amounted to ‘an effectively 
compulsory pre-censorship system.’53
Nonetheless, the public perception of a free press was deemed of great importance, as exem-
pliÀed by a BBC radio broadcast on ‘How Censorship Works’ by the then Controller of the Press 
and Censorship Division at the MOI. On 31 December 1940, Cyril Radcliffe broadcast an expla-
nation of why censorship was required and how the press and the censors worked with one 
another: ‘Each side at heart genuinely wants to help the other: though hearts are not always 
worn on sleeves. It is for the Press Censors to reconcile the right of the Press to produce their 
newspapers with the common duty of the Press and Government to hold back information 
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of Public Relations at the Air Ministry.  
57. Narracott 1943 (reference 56), 56. 
58. Gillman 1978 (reference 44), 43–44.
59. Narracott 1943 (reference 56), 57.
60. This procedure, directing the attention of audiences and influencing atti-
tudes to the bombing offensive, was evident in Bomber Command Continues: 
54. Wilkinson 2009 (reference 46), 185.
55. Taylor 1999 (reference 2), 162.
56. A. H. Narracott, ‘Air Ministry Public Relations’, in: Aeronautics, May 1943, 
56–57; Gillman 1978 (reference 44), 43–50. Narracott worked at The Times be-
fore becoming an Air Ministry Public Relations Officer. Gillman, a member of 
the London staff of the Yorkshire Post before the war, became a Deputy Director 
from the enemy.’54 This positive assessment of the wartime relation between Fleet Street and 
the Ministry was to prove reasonably accurate with only four prosecutions of newspapers re-
sulting from actions taken by the Press and Censorship Division. As Taylor diagnoses, ‘Clashes 
[…] were primarily between Churchill and individual newspapers rather than between MoI 
censors and Fleet Street. […] the Áare-ups that did occur were so few in number that they bear 
witness to the routine day-to-day efÀciency of the censorship system.’55
Radcliffe’s statement was itself indicative of another essential part of managing both news and 
public opinion in wartime: public relations. From articles by two staffs at the Air Ministry, it 
is possible to reconstruct a picture of the public relations organisation that informed the pub-
lic image of Bomber Command in wartime.56 The Air Ministry Directorate of Public Relations 
(based principally in Whitehall with ofÀces in the MOI building) employed 371 staff handling 
press enquiries, press releases and questions of censorship. In 1944, it was described as ‘one of 
the most comprehensive Public Relations departments to be found anywhere in the world.’57
It had its genesis in the First World War which saw the Àrst moves by the British state ‘to de-
velop information policy on a national scale’ and, when the Air Ministry was established in 
1919, it ‘had a Press and Publicity OfÀcer from its inception.’58 This was C. P. Robertson who 
was a Deputy Director of Public Relations with the Air Ministry during the Second World War. 
It was at his instigation that a number of journalists were lined up as volunteer reservists 
before 1939. Following the war’s outbreak, public relations staff were attached to all RAF units 
including Bomber Command.
A key part of this operation was the Air Ministry News Service. The output of the service was 
considerable; by May 1944 it had issued 13,000 news bulletins.59 Narracott provides a hypo-
thetical example of the management of news by the service: 
Let us assume that Bomber Command has carried out a big attack on Berlin, using the 
squadrons of Nos. 27, 28 and 29 Groups for the purpose. The P.R.O.s of these groups talk 
to the crews on their return build up a picture of what has happened over Berlin, and 
telephone a news story to the Command Headquarters. There the news from the three 
groups is collated and then telephoned to the Air Ministry. It is next “vetted” from a 
security angle by the Air Ministry Censorship Department, known as A.I.6, and issued to 
the Press and the B.B.C. by the news division of the Public Relations Department of the 
Air Ministry, via the Ministry of Information. The Air Ministry News Service story of the 
attack (that made up from the Command P.R.O.s’ talk with the crews) is usually sent out 
in full over private wires of the Press Association, the biggest news agency in Britain, so 
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63. Balfour 1979 (reference 16), 262–263.
64. ‘Much better publicity would have been obtained for the magnificent work of 
the R.A.F. if press representatives have been allowed to talk to the pilots when 
they returned’ (Thomson 1947 (reference 51), 180). 
65. Cited by McLaine, 1979 (reference 4), 161–162. See also Knapp, ‘The Allied 
Bombing Offensive in the British Media, 1942–45,’ 39–40.
‘Here is an extract from a log in which a Public Relations Officer for the R.A.F. 
who took part in one of these assaults has recorded the impressions of a spec-
tator not in the front row but on the stage itself’ (40). Note the emphasis on 
spectacle implied by the theatrical analogy. 
61. Narracott 1943 (reference 56), 56. 
62. Williams 1946 (reference 6), 22.
that it reaches the ofÀces of the newspapers and the B.B.C. within a few minutes of being 
issued from the Ministry of Information.60
Thus, news about Bomber Command operations was carefully managed. So too was press ac-
cess to air bases in Britain. Permits were required for such visits by journalists and photogra-
phers. Visits were stage-managed by PROs, the respective station receiving advance notice.61
This overview of the organisation of the public relations operations amply substantiates 
Francis Williams’s assentation that ‘the Air Ministry was the most publicity-minded of all the 
Service Ministries.’62
The intensive activity around public relations was not at Àrst the expression of a sensitivity 
to the public image of Bomber Command. This preoccupied government departments and the 
military in later stages of the conÁict following the radicalization of the bombing war. In the 
early years, aside from Bomber Command Britain possessed no obvious offensive weapon with 
which to counter the Third Reich that had achieved considerable military successes on the 
continent before launching the Blitz in 1940. The Soviet Union only joined the Allied nations 
in June 1941 and the US later still in December 1941. In a period of uncertainty and apprehen-
sion, Bomber Command stood as the chief symbol of the British war effort—a position aided 
by the role of the RAF during the Battle of Britain in counteracting German preparations for 
an invasion of the UK. As Balfour notes, as late as 1942, ‘Bomber Command was still the only 
real weapon of offence which Britain possessed. To meet the public demand for action against 
Germany, a picture of the Command’s strength and effectiveness had been sedulously built 
up.’63 Bomber Command, Target for To-night and Bomber Command Continues were a part of building 
up that picture. Having been constructed, it had to be carefully managed and maintained. 
Such efforts were not always well regarded. Thomson, for instance, was underwhelmed by the 
results of the Air Ministry News Service, retrospectively criticising the quality of the writ-
ten reports it produced.64 Moreover, Air Ministry public relations efforts came under Àre at 
the time and within the organisation. McLaine discusses fractious exchanges between Harris 
and various members of the Air Ministry. In 1943, Harris complained that the work of Bomber 
Command in targeting German civilians was not receiving due coverage or credit. He argued 
that the aim of the offensive should be ‘unambiguously stated as the destruction of German 
cities, the killing of German workers and the disruption of civilised community life through-
out Germany.’65 Albeit couched in evasive language, the message from Harris’s superiors was 
obvious: a public lack of clarity or emphasis on the aims and achievements of the bombing of-
fensive was more important than an accurate depiction of the true impact and toll which could 
PhotoResearcher No 25201674
it still enjoyed wide circulation; a publication’s ration was calculated as a per-
centage of their usage in the year before war began. Moreover, as noted in the 
report of the Royal Commission on the Press in 1949, ‘Circulation figures of 
course give no indication of the number of people who read the publications. 
Even a newspaper which is out of date in a matter of hours is normally read by 
more than one person; and a periodical, which, with a life of a week or more, 
66. McLaine 1979 (reference 4), 162.
67. Hansard, HC Deb, 1 December 1943, vol. 395, cc.337–9. 
68. Fox 2015 (reference 7), 97. 
69. Picture Post was a weekly photo-magazine launched in October 1938 that 
achieved circulation figures of 1,350,000 within four months. While it was sub-
ject to paper rationing in wartime, as Britain’s most popular photo-magazine 
provoke protest from religious or paciÀst groups. As McLaine concludes, ‘What appears to have 
been a serious policy disagreement, with fatal consequences for thousands of Germans, was, 
after all, a mere difference of view on what should be said publicly about the RAF’s raids.’66
This deliberate lack of clarity regarding bombing policy is also evident from numerous ex-
changes in the House of Commons. On 1 December 1943, for instance, MP Richard Stokes chal-
lenged Air Minister Archibald Sinclair, asking whether the policy of ‘limiting objectives of 
Bomber Command to targets of military importance’ had shifted to one of bombing towns 
and wide areas in which military targets are situated.’ No was the unequivocal (and untruth-
ful) answer.67 Having constructed an image of considered and informed action by dedicated 
teams of experts prior to 1942, Àdelity to the Command’s direction after 1942 was not a pri-
ority for the Air Ministry as a whole (much to Harris’s annoyance). Rather, the aim was to 
maintain the public image of Bomber Command. Limp publicity, ambiguity and misdirection 
were central to this effort. 
Thus, there were serious limitations placed on the choices open to newspapers and magazines 
regarding what images they could publish depicting Bomber Command and its operations. As 
important as the system of censorship operated by the MOI was the control exercised by the 
Air Ministry via the drafting and the issuing of stories to the press. As Fox summarises, ‘While 
liberal governments publicly stated that censorship was “voluntary,” in reality, the Àghting 
Figure 6
Unknown photographer, 
‘A Girl goes into war industry’, 
in: Picture Post, 10 January 1942, 16–17.
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Lord Beaverbrook, until November 1942, see: Edgerton 1992 (reference 2), 69. 
72. Edgerton 1992 (reference 2), 65, 72.
73. ‘The Masses who make the Lancaster’ [Reader’s letter], in: Picture Post, 24 
October 1942, 2.
74. ‘An Airman gets ready for an Op’, in: Picture Post, 26 February 1944, 17–19.
passes from hand to hand in homes and clubs and waiting rooms, has a cor-
respondingly higher readership’, in: Royal Commission on the Press, 1947-1949: 
Report, London: H.M.S.O. 1949, 14).
70. ‘A Girl goes into war industry’, in: Picture Post, 10 January 1942, 16–19. See 
also, ‘Another mosquito to bomb Berlin’, in: Picture Post, 11 Dec 1943, 8–12.
71. The Ministry was itself presided over by the proprietor of the Daily Express, 
services and other government departments tightly controlled the release of information.’68
It was within this context that Picture Post operated and I turn now to look at their coverage 
following the escalation of the bombing offensive from 1942.
Industrious Britain: Images of aircrews and aircraft manufacturing
The Air Ministry sponsored MOI publications provided a template for subsequent press cov-
erage of Bomber Command. This template was taken up by the press presumably because it 
tapped into existing stereotypes and conventions, but also because it was reinforced by the 
material (visual and verbal) released by Air Ministry public relations staff. Demonstrating 
this uptake, key facets of Picture Post coverage of the air offensive between 1942 and 1945 
included a focus on the people working in the wider support services for Bomber Command 
such as aircraft production; on servicemen and the technology they rely on; and on aerial 
reconnaissance photography.69
‘A Girl Goes into War Industry’ (Àg. 6) is a typical photo-essay regarding those working in 
positions supporting the bombing campaign.70 The Àfth instalment of a series titled ‘Women 
at War,’ it depicts working life inside an aircraft factory overseen by the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production.71 At the height of production, 1.5m people were employed making aircraft (rep-
resenting a third of the wartime manufacturing labour force), while a further 1m ‘largely 
non-combatant personnel’ were employed by the RAF.72 Not only does this photo-story show 
the factory’s impressive interior, it also exempliÀes the inclusive ethos and collective effort 
that typiÀed representation of the war effort. A letter by a reader later the same year charac-
terised this attitude when they referred to the production of the Lancaster as ‘a magniÀcent 
social achievement.’73 The combined 2.5m employees of the RAF and associated industries 
was a sizeable audience for Picture Post. Moreover, the issue of war production was an ongoing 
topic of debate in the press at the time and good news stories about this issue were deemed 
to be of interest to the magazine’s readership. Perhaps more importantly, such stories would 
have been pushed by public relations ofÀcers all the more to compensate for the absence of 
detailed information about the impact of the bombing campaign. A wealth of positive image-
ry could be generated from the many factories producing aircraft and munitions. These were 
uplifting photo-stories, tapping into the romance of the air while avoiding the speciÀcities of 
the horrors of war. 
Like ‘A Girl goes into war Industry,’ ‘An Airman gets ready for an op’ is a human-interest 
story focused on the experience of one individual.74 Like other stories of aircrew in the maga-
zine, coverage is limited largely to the experience of the servicemen in the UK, addressing 
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78. Thomson noted with a sense of disappointment that, ‘Photos of devastated 
areas with arrows pointing to damaged buildings were issued from time to 
time, but it was impossible for the average layman to appreciate their signifi-
cance’, in: Thomson 1947 (reference 51), 179–180.
79. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see for example F. J. Mortimer, 
‘Photography’s part in the war’, in: Photographic Journal LXXXI (1941), 124–145. 
80. This advert (‘RAF Jigsaw,’ Picture Post, 7 August 1943, 7) was part of a cam-
paign that sought to enhance the Ilford brand by depicting the use of its prod-
ucts in the work of photographic reconnaissance.
75. For instance, ‘A Stirling carries eight tons of bombs’, in: Picture Post, 19 
September 1942, 13–15. See also, ‘A Bomber goes on test’, in: Picture Post, 10 
October 1942, 8–12.
76. ‘Experiment in Ballistics’, in: Picture Post, 13 January 1945, 20–23.
77. ‘How to read an aerial photograph’, in: Picture Post, 5 June 1943, 20–21 
& 25. Other photo-stories using aerial reconnaissance imagery include: ‘A 
Mosquito’s view of the city of Berlin’, in: Picture Post, 11 September 1943, 18–21 
and ‘Photo-reconnaissance: Prelude to Attack’, in: Picture Post, 4 November 
1944, 8–11.
preparation, training or testing 
rather than bombing itself. This 
story includes an annotated image 
of the airman in full Áying gear 
(Àg. 7). With a sense of reverence, 
items of kit are detailed including 
Perspex goggles, inÁatable life-
boat, oxygen mask and parachute. 
A similar sense of admiration for 
technological achievements is evi-
dent in other articles concerning 
the planes themselves.75 Likewise, ‘Experiment in Ballistics’ is a photo-story developed in 
collaboration with the Armaments Research Department concerning new munitions.76 It in-
cludes a photograph of a 500lb bomb, as well as discussion of the innovative new camera used 
to record the testing.
In Picture Post, as in Bomber Command, photography itself was a topic of debate, not merely a 
means of illustration. In June 1943, including images of the Dambusters raid on the Möhne 
dam, the magazine published a story titled, ‘How to read an aerial photograph’ (Àg. 8).77 Self-
reÁexive discussion of the medium was a hallmark of the emerging photo-magazines of the 
interwar period. But as well as continuing this practice, it is likely that this article was a so-
lution to a particular problem—that a lot of imagery coming out of the Air Ministry was not 
particularly engaging.78 The article is at pains to emphasise the strategic importance of pho-
tography, describing the images after the raid as ‘a brilliant example of photography’s value 
in warfare.’79 Moreover, the article Áags up the use of holiday snapshots submitted to the Air 
Ministry by the public in analysing the structures for vulnerabilities. There are no images of 
the destruction caused in the communities living beneath the dam. The aerial photographs 
(as highlighted two years earlier in Bomber Command) actually mask levels of destruction, 
rather than reveal them. The focus here is instead the medium itself. Attention is directed 
away from the content of the image to the practice of aerial reconnaissance, celebrating how, 
in the words of an Ilford advert of the time, ‘Photography is mobilized for war’ (Àg. 9).80
Reconnaissance photographs were a central aspect of the maintenance of the public im-
age of Bomber Command. Such imagery implies a sense of mastery and power. As John 
Figure 7
Unknown photographer, 
‘An Airman gets ready for an Op’,
 in: Picture Post, 26 February 1944, 19.
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the results of bombing for munitions and aircraft manufacturing workers (see 
Gillman, 49, and Williams, Press, Parliament and People, 80–81). The wartime 
reconnaissance photographs now form part of the National Collection of Aerial 
Photography, (Edinburgh: Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical 
Monuments of Scotland) <http://ncap.org.uk/> (14 January 2016).
83. Taylor 1991 (reference 81), 59.
84. Stuart Hall, ‘The Social Eye of Picture Post’, in: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, 2 (1972), 71–120. A seminal photo-essay concerned the Beveridge re-
port: ‘Beveridge: The Fight is on’, in: Picture Post, 6 March 1943, 7–11.
81. John Taylor, War Photography: Realism in the British Press, Abingdon: 
Routledge 1991, 57.
82. While the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit was based at RAF Medmenham, 
the PROs were in Wembley. They also published Evidence in Camera. A maga-
zine for RAF personnel, it comprised aerial reconnaissance imagery of German 
cities, providing a visual record of the destruction (albeit of a very particular 
sort). First weekly, then fortnightly it ran to 103 issues. See Allan Williams, 
Operation Crossbow: The Untold Story of Photographic Intelligence and the Search 
for Hitler’s V Weapons, London: Preface 2013, 68–69; and Powys-Lybbe, 44–45. 
Air Ministry PROs ran a similar campaign, called ‘Works Relations’ showcasing 
Taylor suggests, a God’s eye view 
is evocative of forms of omnisci-
ence through the vicarious power 
of surveillance which it offers.81
The powerful potential of the 
aerial photograph was recog-
nised and deployed by the Press 
and Public Relations Section of 
the Photographic Reconnaissance 
Unit which in March 1943 organised, Bomb Damage on Germany, a touring photographic ex-
hibition.82 However, the public recirculation of aerial imagery did not only suggest a form 
of visual dominance over the enemy. It had positive connotations for the viewing audience. 
The Picture Post story on how to read an aerial photograph offered viewers membership of a 
community whose efforts were striking at the heart of enemy territory; ‘it brought together 
bofÀns, heroes and civilians.’83 The conventional wisdom about aerial imagery is that it has a 
distancing effect. No doubt, this is accurate in this instance vis-à-vis British perspectives on 
German suffering. But it can also be seen in this context to have a more complex character—a 
binding effect, bringing together a community of disparate members under the banner of a 
common purpose through shared acts of both production and interpretation. The pages of 
Picture Post were a Àtting place for deployment of such visual strategies. Combining articles 
and letters, the magazine represented a potent combination of expert opinion and readers’ 
voices, alongside engaging visuals. Although Picture Post is more renowned for its focus on 
social democratic issues in wartime, the same successful format can be seen to have had a 
bearing on public understanding of the bombing war.
Public debate about bombing policy
Picture Post was instrumental in helping to shape the political agenda in wartime Britain in 
ways that had a signiÀcant impact on postwar decisions regarding social provision. This cam-
paigning aspect—memorably termed, ‘the social eye of Picture Post’ by Stuart Hall—was cen-
tral to the way the magazine presented itself to its readers.84 In an article from January 1942, 
the editor, Tom Hopkinson, outlined the magazine’s record of critiquing the war effort and 
the government in the national interest. He described the publication as ‘a paper which not 
only reports, but criticises. It is a paper of opinion—on politics, on social questions, above all 
Figure 8
Unknown photographer, 
‘How to read an aerial photograph’, 
in: Picture Post, 5 June 1943, 20–21.
Figure 9
Unknown photographer, 
‘RAF Jigsaw’ [Advert for Ilford], 
in: Picture Post, 7 August 1943, 7.
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88. On this, see also an article on government criticism of the Daily Mirror,
4 April 1942, 16-17; and ‘The fight to maintain the freedom of the press’, in: 
Picture Post, 25 April 1942, 14-15. 
89. ‘What British bombers can do to Germany’, in: Picture Post, 20 June, 1942, 10.
85. Tom Hopkinson, ‘Should we stop criticising?’, in: Picture Post, 31 January 
1943, 22–23.
86. Tom Hopkinson, Of This Our Time: A Journalist’s Story, 1905–50, London: 
Hutchison 1982, 202–204.
87. Readers’ responses were published over four consecutive weeks from 14 
February 1942. 
on the conduct of the war.’85 The self-deÀnition of the 
magazine as a paper and not a magazine—as part of the 
institution of the press, not as a vehicle of entertain-
ment—is noteworthy. Here, as elsewhere, Hopkinson 
was contributing to building a picture of a free press 
in general. SpeciÀcally, he was projecting an image of 
Picture Post as a critically engaged and socially respon-
sible publication. The article resulted from a censure 
by the MOI following criticism in Picture Post of the kit 
supplied to soldiers in North Africa. In his memoirs, 
Hopkinson describes being called before the Minister, 
Brendan Bracken, in winter 1941.86 The editor assert-
ed that while the MOI took action against Picture Post 
(stopping circulation of the magazine in North Africa), 
the magazine did not alter its conduct of speaking 
truth to power. In his 1942 article, Hopkinson invited 
the public to join the debate: ‘we intend to continue 
our policy exactly as before, to criticise when there is 
need for it, to applaud when it is deserved. […] What do 
you think? We should like to know.’87 Accepting both 
the invitation and the image of Picture Post as an organ 
of democratic debate, readers wrote in.88
On the issue of area bombing, however, this spirit of 
informed debate was not assiduously pursued. At the 
time of the escalation of the offensive, the little discus-
sion there was about bombing policy lacked a strong 
critical edge. This is evident from an analysis of arti-
cles covering the period from summer 1942 to autumn 1943, and of the imagery that accom-
panied them. Around the time of the raids on Essen and Bremen, Picture Post published a map 
to illustrate, ‘What British Bombers can do to Germany.’89 It was only a one-page item, but 
it suggests both public appetite for and knowledge of the escalation. The unnamed author 
wrote about the excitement generated by a thousand bomber raids on Germany and sug-
gested, ‘There is disappointment now if a few days pass without another big raid.’ The map 
showed the opportunities provided for bombing by longer daylight hours, including more 
easterly urban areas described as ‘leading manufacturing cities.’ This positive assertion that 
Figure 10
Unknown photographer, 
‘A rear-gunner of a Sterling prepares for 
a raid over Germany’, 
cover of: Picture Post, 17 October 1942.
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92. ‘Readers’ Letters’, in: Picture Post, 7 November 1942, 3. 90. ‘Can bombing break Germany?’, in: Picture Post, 17 October 1942, 13–18. 
91. Picture Post 17 October 1942 (reference 90), 16.
attacks could ‘affect the course of the war’ was little different from the ofÀcial line expressed 
in the MOI publications and it changed little in subsequent Picture Post coverage.  
In October 1942, Picture Post published what at Àrst glance appears to be a considered assess-
ment of the bombing strategy in an article trailed on the front cover using an image of a rear 
gunner in a Stirling aircraft (Àg. 10).90 The tone taken is not deferential, describing belief in 
victory through bombing as ‘almost a religion’ and noting how ‘with stern single-minded-
ness, our Air Marshalls cling to their creed.’ Using quotations from British and American 
commanders, the Air Ministry’s case is set out. Harris is reported as saying, ‘We will bomb 
Germany so persistently and so severely that her power to make war will be crippled.’ General 
Ira Eaker, commanding US Air Force personnel in the UK, is quoted as remarking, ‘The German 
workpeople must have houses to live in and utility services to keep them alive. These are very 
vulnerable to air attack.’ The text goes on to address the issue of ‘area bombing’ using exactly 
that term and drawing a comparison between the Allied policy and German tactics: 
The Germans gave up target bombing quite early in their attack on this country. They 
came to the conclusion that there is no such thing as accurate night bombing, but that 
it did not very much matter, because production is slowed down just as much by hitting 
the homes of the workers as by bombing their factories.91
There is no room for public doubt about what the Allied strategy will bring about. As regards 
an opposing point of view, the article suggests that critics of the policy question the cost and 
time taken to achieve the objectives of disrupting industry and communications. However, 
while efÀcacy is under scrutiny, the creed itself is not the focus of reÁection. Almost as an 
aside, the article concludes by suggesting that bombing might be the prelude to a land of-
fensive. Thus, although the article is described as ‘a full objective survey,’ it stops short of an 
engagement with the issue in anything but strategic terms, failing to meet the standards of 
critical reÁection that the paper set itself. Moreover, approving responses to the article (by a 
Norwegian ofÀcial and from the director of the De Havilland Aircraft Co.) were published, but 
no opposing points of view were aired amongst the readers’ letters printed subsequently.92
The relationship between the text and the imagery is crucial in regard to this compliant or ac-
cepting stance. The photographic illustrations further denude the lacklustre critical nature of 
the article. Statements of the extent and focus of the campaign articulated through the words 
of Harris and Eaker do not chime with the imagery. The two photographs above the article’s 
headline are before and after aerial shots of a factory in Cologne from May 1940 (a duet also 
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94. ‘The Man who picks the target for tonight’, in: Picture Post, 10 July 1943, 
8–10. 
93. Picture Post 17 October 1942 (reference 90), 13.
used in Bomber Command Continues). Moreover, a double-page spread with a 
map and 36 labelled towns or cities implies the legitimacy of the targets 
of area bombing, listing population sizes alongside the chief industries. A 
selection of images of aircraft in Áight is labelled ‘the tools to do the job’ 
(Àg. 11) assuming the validity of the job. Another visual shows ‘what one 
bomb can do,’ but resolutely works against what critical reÁection there is 
on what the bombing policy should do. The one outspoken moment in the 
article might help explain the dissonance between the positive imagery 
and the more questioning (albeit not outright critical) text. The author 
comments disapprovingly of the Air Ministry News Service:
Whether it is printed anonymously or re-written under the names of the 
air correspondents, the source of the news is always the same. […] A nation 
that understands what it is trying to do in war is much stronger than one 
that fumbles along, hoping for the best, but ready to be pleasantly lulled 
by its own ofÀcial publicity.93
Presumably the imagery for the article on this issue was provided by 
the Air Ministry, perhaps originating with the RAF Directorate of Public 
Relations or the Press and Public Relations Section of the Photographic 
Reconnaissance Unit.
A hagiographic article on Harris the following year has the feel of a syn-
dicated piece where both text and illustrations are provided to the pa-
per (Àg. 12).94 It comprises a set of photographs of Bomber Command’s 
Commander-in-Chief and a commentary by E. Colston Shepherd, editor 
of The Aeroplane (a commercial weekly aviation magazine launched in 
1911). The article is a carefully crafted portrait whereby stage-managed 
photographs and deferential text collaborate to project a Àrm-but-fair image of Harris. The 
photographs depict him at work and at home with his family. One picture shows Harris at 
his desk looking at aerial reconnaissance images and surrounded by members of staff. The 
caption reads: ‘The men who help him to decide – In the Conference Room the C.-in-C. studies 
bomb damage. With him are the Senior Air-Staff OfÀcer, Deputy Senior Air-Staff OfÀcer, and 
the Group Captains of Intelligence and Armaments.’ Again, the image of considered action 
by experts in their Àeld is conveyed. Reinforced throughout for the audience in this com-
bined visual and verbal portrait is the image of Harris as resolute and determined: ‘Of all his 
Figure 11
Unknown photographer, 
‘The tools to do the job’, in: Picture Post, 
17 October 1942, 14.
PhotoResearcher No 25201681
such sources), they accuse me of not only being the executor of the bombing 
policy but also its author’ (Harris 1947 (reference 23), 88–89).  
96. This latter publication was a repeated formula, reproducing and denigrat-
ing German propaganda. On German wartime press coverage see also, ‘How 
the German People see the war’, in: Picture Post, 28 August 1943, 7–13.
97. ‘Bombing: A Choice of Policies’, in: Picture Post, 25 September 1943, 7–9.
95. As evident from his memoirs, Harris was not indifferent about his public 
image: ‘There is a widespread impression, that has often got into print, that I 
not only invented the policy of area bombing but also insisted on carrying it out 
in the face of the natural reluctance to kill women and children that was felt by 
everyone else. The facts are otherwise. […] Whenever anyone wish to black-
guard me, as the Economist and the Daily Worker have done (a compliment from 
characteristics, a quality of persistence is one of the most valuable […]. Harris’s restless search 
for better ways and means … therein lies the true greatness of Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 
Harris.’95 Readers are even directed by the text as to how they should interpret his appearance 
in the accompanying images: ‘To look at Sir Arthur Harris, broad-shouldered, bull-necked, of 
medium height, unsmiling […] is to see the sort of ofÀcer with whom no one takes liberties.’ 
But even if the article itself was pre-digested and printed as directed by ofÀcial PROs in Picture 
Post, the central reverent message is supported by the content and tone of other items in-
cluded in the same issue. A letter from a reader in Cardiff, for instance, passionately demands 
the RAF ‘Smash Germany Thoroughly Now.’ Preceding the piece on Harris is an article on 
Franco with reference to Guernica. Following are reproductions of extracts from the Berliner 
Illustrierte Zeitung carrying theatrical drawings of German raids on the UK.96
An article in the autumn of 1943 titled ‘Bombing: A Choice of Policies’ seemed like it might 
offer an alternative position in the interests of balance.97 Vernon Blunt takes issue with ‘the 
“bomb Germany to hell” school,’ arguing that the idea Germany is on the point of collapse due 
to bombing is ‘a matter of faith rather than of proved fact.’ However, Blunt is not concerned 
about whether to bomb or not, but how best to bomb. He talks of the ‘justiÀable pride in 
the achievements of the men who Áy heavy bombers’ and aims only ‘to correct extravagant 
theories according to which we can 
win the war on the cheap.’ A bomb-
ing policy that supports advancing 
forces is the proper approach ac-
cording to Blunt, but this is a very 
controlled articulation of a moder-
ate criticism. Nor is the measured 
critique enhanced by the accompa-
nying photographs of industrious 
ground crew readying runways at 
night using electric lighting.  
That the debate on area bombing 
hosted on the pages of Picture Post 
was measured and slight is also cor-
roborated by an article published a 
fortnight previously.98 ‘A Mosquito’s 
view of the city of Berlin’ shows 
Figure 12
Unknown photographer, 
‘The Man who picks the target for tonight’, 
in: Picture Post, 10 July 1943, 8–9.
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99. This attitude was itself a subject on which Picture Post did stage debate, 
even if the bombing war was not an issue which attracted substantive criti-
cal reflection. See for example: ‘Should we blame the whole German people?’, 
in: Picture Post, 17 July 1943, 24–26; and H.G. Wells, ‘How should we treat the 
German people?’, in: (Picture Post, 31 July 1943, 20). 
98. ‘A Mosquito’s view of the city of Berlin’, in: Picture Post, 11 September 1943, 
18-21.
some of the great landmarks of the German capital ‘before they were bombed’ alongside a 
commentary that offers ‘some of the reasons why Berlin is the most important target of all for 
the R.A.F.’ The text running alongside the aerial views of potential targets addresses the topic 
of housing, describing the many tenement blocks and the civilian defence issues they present: 
‘This method of construction presents special A.R.P problems, for the families living in the 
back courtyards are virtually trapped if a bomb falls near the entrance to the front court.’ 
A paragraph later, the author proposes the following rhetorical question: ‘Will civilisation 
lose anything of vast importance by the destruction of the “city of tenement-blocks, built on 
sand”?’ Not only is the text here evidence of a public knowledge of and proposing a particular 
attitude towards the bombing of German residential areas, but the photographic imagery 
which accompanies it underpins this attitude.99 The images show the public buildings of a 
city intact; there is no intimation of the effects of the bombing of civilian populations in 
this photo-story. The article concluded by stressing the symbolism of Berlin rather than the 
experience of Berliners. ‘Berlin has a mystical importance to every German. It is the city of 
Frederick the Great, that sovereign on whom Goebbels so frequently calls in his efforts to rally 
the people. It is the city which symbolises the idea of a powerful, uniÀed Germany.’ The Picture 
Post audience was encouraged to relish the symbolic resonance of raids on Berlin, rather than 
appreciate their material and human impact.  
Indeed, no photo-story on the topic of bombing indicated through its imagery the scale or 
experience of what was taking place. Following the escalation of the bombing war from 1942, 
Figure 13
Unknown photographer, 
‘What the bomb-aimer sees’, in: Picture Post,
13 March 1943, 10–11.
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101. A complete collection of the Bombing Restrictions Committee publications 
is held by the National Library of Scotland.
102. Hansard, HC Deb, 24 November 1942, vol. 385, cc.686. 
103. Hansard, HL Deb, 9 February 1944, vol. 130, cc.737–45.
104. Hansard, HC Deb, 6 March 1945, vol. 130, cc.1864 & 1900.
100. Regarding wartime tolerance and marginalisation of dissenting voices on 
the issue of area bombing, see Richard Overy, ‘Pacifism and the Blitz, 1940–
1941’, in: Past and Present 2013, 219 (1), 201–236; and Andrew Chandler, ‘The 
Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of German in the Second 
World War’, in: English Historical Review (1993), 920–946. Overy observes that, 
‘There is no doubt that pacifist activity was deliberately inhibited both by formal 
restrictions and by popular hostility’ (Overy, ‘Pacifism and the Blitz,’ 208).
there is a notable absence of the street views advocated in Bomber Command in 1941. Thus, 
while the public were in a position to know what was going on, they were not viewing the sort 
of imagery that would allow them to understand what the prosecution of an air war on this 
scale meant. Indeed, they were actively discouraged from doing so, being asked to think about 
technology, experts and aircrews instead. When attention did turn to Germany, it was with a 
tightly managed frame of reference. 
There were forthright and articulate critics of the bombing offensive who could have pro-
vided a stronger critical edge to the public debate about bombing staged in wartime issues of 
Picture Post. These were known entities. They included members of the clergy and of parlia-
ment, as well as committed paciÀsts.100 Economist H. Stanley Jevons was, for instance, Chair 
of the Bombing Restrictions Committee. Established in 1942, it published nine pamphlets 
against area bombing including Vera Brittain’s ‘Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really 
Means.’101 MP Richard Stokes spoke in the House of Commons on 24 November 1942, protest-
ing that ‘women and little children are women and little children to me, wherever they live, 
and it Àlls me with absolute nausea to think of the Àlthy task that many of our young men are 
being invited to carry out.’102 Bishop George Bell, perhaps the most prominent critic, spoke in 
the House of Lords on 4 February 1944 against the campaign. Citing articles from The Times of 
10 January 1944, he reprimanded the government, observing that ‘the policy is obliteration, 
openly acknowledged’ and describing the belief that bombing would shorten the war and 
reduce Allied fatalities as ‘pure speculation.’103 From outright condemnation to more modest 
calls for a change in policy, such critics held a range of positions on the issue of bombing. All 
sought a wider public debate on what Stokes critiqued Sinclair for terming, ‘almost gloating-
ly,’ ‘the swelling crescendo of destruction.’104 Yet, notwithstanding its stated commitment to 
report critically ‘on politics, on social questions, above all on the conduct of the war,’ Picture 
Post failed to provide that platform.  
Visual spectacle and the bombing war
Coverage of the bombing campaign did not simply fail to meet the critical standards Picture 
Post set for itself; it reduced the campaign to the sorts of spectacular imagery that was the 
staple of the commercial photo-magazine. There were frequent invocations to readers to take 
forms of enjoyment in looking at photographs that depicted the bombing war. A host of ar-
ticles aestheticized the air war, repeating the templates from the interwar period of revel-
ling in unusual and arresting views provided by means of the airborne camera. For instance, 
‘What the bomb-aimer sees’ (Àg. 13) offered seven aerial photographs depicting ‘Patterns of 
strange delicacy and beauty [that] meet the eye of the bomb-aimer, as he waits the moment 
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‘One ship, One Bomb’, in: Picture Post, 19 June 1943, 17; ‘After the RAF’s visit’, 
in: Picture Post, 2 October 1943, 19; ‘What is it?’, in; Picture Post, 22 July 1944, 
15; ‘What happens when gunners and bombers pin-point an island’, in: Picture 
Post, 30 September 1944, 15; and ‘Nine years in the life of a bridge’, in: Picture 
Post, 28 April 1945, 13.
109. Thomson 1947 (reference 51), 174.
105. ‘What the bomb-aimer sees’, in: Picture Post, 13 March 1943, 10–11.
106. ‘Patterns of War in the German Skies’, in: Picture Post, 25 March 1944, 14 
& 15.
107. ‘Phosphorous bombs in the streets of Berlin’, in: Picture Post, 19 Feb 1944, 
16.
108. For example: ‘A hit … and a miss’, in: Picture Post, 9 January 1943, 12; 
to make terrifying changes in the shapes he sees below.’105 Notable by their absence are aer-
ial photographs of populated urban areas; the majority are of nautical subjects. Similarly, 
‘Patterns of War in the German Skies’ provides a montage of photographs of contrails with the 
strap-line: ‘On German soil, the daylight war increases the indescribable chaos. In German 
air, the patterns, made by the bombers and Àghters, are omens of the fate that is overtaking 
the country.’106 Knowledge of what was happening is evident, but understanding is foreclosed 
through striking imagery of tangential subjects like cloud formations. When images of the 
impact on German streets were rarely shown, even these were marked by a lack of revelation. 
‘Phosphorous bombs in the streets of Berlin,’ for instance, includes night-time photographs 
reminiscent of nothing more than a Àreworks display.107 The commentary is chilling (‘Not 
all the sand in Berlin nor all the water in the Spree, seem likely to put out the Áames which 
raise from the blazing asphalt and spurt all over the melting street’), but the visual material 
provides little additional insight. Indeed, it works against the declarations of the text, under-
mining whatever revelations it offers.
Throughout the war numerous other one-page features (designed around photographs of 
novel subjects or familiar subjects photographed in novel ways) encouraged the consumption 
of the bombing war as a spectacle.108 Given the management of the news by the Air Ministry, 
we can assume these were released to the press. Conversely, we may also assume that more 
detailed images of the impact were not. An analysis of issues of Picture Post in relation to 
the major Bomber Command operations from 1942 onwards reveals very little correlation 
between the intensiÀcation of the offensive and the coverage it received. Thomson inadvert-
ently acknowledges the success of this management when he noted that: 
Of all the years, 1943 was by far the easiest and most quiet for the censors. It was a year 
of Allied advances and victories in Europe, Africa and the Far East, with all the new war 
factories in this country and in the United States in full production. And where there 
are victories, censorship does not seem to have the importance that is given to it in the 
days of defeats and imminent danger. […] Germany was being pounded from the air day 
and night by the United States Army 8th and 9th Air Forces and the R.A.F. It was indeed 
a rosy picture.109
The choice of examples (factories in full production, Germany being pounded from the air) 
and terminology (‘a rosy picture’) is telling. It reÁects the central role played by photo-stories 
about manufacturing and technological accomplishment, as well as aerial reconnaissance 
imagery, in constructing and maintaining the public image of Bomber Command in wartime. 
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‘Millions Like Us’? British Culture in the Second World War, Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press 1999, 93–124 (119).
Stories provided by the Air Ministry to the press, although they drew criticism, helped secure 
a commitment to the air war that was shared far and wide; a commitment based on public 
knowledge but avoiding public understanding of what was taking place. Michael Bromley has 
suggested that there may have been an element of complicity between Picture Post and the au-
thorities on this issue. Noting ‘the magazine’s run-ins with the authorities in the early years 
of the war,’ Bromley goes on to speculate that the magazine ‘struck deals with the govern-
ment, and it remains a matter of conjecture precisely how enmeshed it was in the expanding 
activities of the state’s information services.’110
Analysis of the debate staged regarding bombing policy on the pages of Picture Post demon-
strates that it did not have a sharp critical edge, while analysis of the photographs depicting 
the bombing war reveals that the photo-magazine did not offer readers a clear view of the 
impact of the campaign. Whether the magazine was complicit with or simply reactive to the 
unfolding situation of the new public relations terrain is not simple to judge, but it does seem 
evident that the editorial staff was not satisÀed with the position they were put in. The prob-
lem was illustrated by the poor range and depth of coverage in an issue from 24 March 1945, 
for instance. While the front cover declared, ‘In this issue: Into Germany,’ there were only two 
short articles on this topic. ‘The Battle of Germany: From the Heavens’ showed more aerial 
reconnaissance imagery, while ‘Into Germany house by house’ showed just a few images of 
street Àghting.111 Moreover, the Service Ministries’ image management strategies drew ex-
plicit Àre from Picture Post following the D-Day landings, however. An editorial comment on 
15 July 1944 asked, ‘Where are the pictures?’:
The taking of pictures at the battle front is to-day in the hands of the Army Film and 
Photographic Unit. It includes many extremely able photographers, taken from papers 
like our own […]. Where is their work? The Ministry of Information cannot help us. It 
has no control over any front-line cameramen. It is simply an issuing-house for pictures 
handed to it by the military authorities. Where are the real front-line pictures? […] The 
British public wants them. We want to give them to the public. Where are the pictures?112
This is clearly a signal that while Picture Post had a social eye when it came to the domestic po-
litical agenda, it gave a militarily-sanctioned perspective on the bombing war. This may have 
been an intentional response to the public mood, or simply a result of the tight management 
by the Air Ministry of publicly-circulating news photographs. Perhaps it was both. Clearly, by 
the end of the war the magazine editors felt it was not in a position to deliver what its audience 
wanted. Conversely, government ofÀcials were convinced of the value of the photo-magazine 
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pers, see Knapp 2013 (reference 3), 45–51. 
116. Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, London: Verso 2010, 
63.
117. Butler 2010 (reference 116), 65 & 100.
113. Holman 2005 (reference 31), 220. The comment comes from a report ti-
tled ‘Ministry Magazine Policy’ and dated 24 April 1945 (National Archives, 
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114. Edgerton 1992 (reference 2), 59. 
in meeting their agenda; Fraser, now Controller of Production at the MOI, wrote in April 1945 
that ‘the illustrated magazine plainly has an outstanding contemporary popular appeal in all 
educated countries where people seem to Ànd it more palatable than other types of printed 
material. [… It is] a weapon we should keep in use as long as possible.’113
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, Àlm has rightly received much critical attention, but credit for 
what Edgerton called ‘the popular picture of the air war’ in Britain must also be shared with 
the still camera image.114 Too often, photography has been notable for its absence in discus-
sion of wartime propaganda, public relations and the press. Such reÁection cannot answer 
questions about the efÀcacy or morality of the bombing campaign pursued by Britain against 
Germany. What it does illustrate, however, is that while the British public had ample cause to 
understand what this offensive entailed, they were not helped to conceive of what it meant. 
Public knowledge of a policy of area bombing did not amount to public understanding of the 
impact of area bombing. Indeed, public understanding was impeded by the image of Bomber 
Command forged in the early years of the war and maintained thereafter.115
Addressing contemporary news coverage, Judith Butler questions ‘the way in which suffering 
is presented to us, and how that presentation affects our responsiveness.’116 With regard to 
the war on terror, embedded photographers and photographs of torture, she has scrutinised 
the activities of state authorities in ‘regulating perspective in addition to content’ to manu-
facture a phenomenon of ‘“not seeing” in the midst of seeing.’117 It is a comparable situation 
in Britain with regard to photography’s role in sustaining the disjunction between public 
knowledge and public understanding of the air war. Public perception of Bomber Command 
and the bombing offensive was fashioned by text and image, its particular character shaped 
by the interplay of what was said and seen, what was not said and not seen. It is only by criti-
cally addressing the position of photography as a practice in wartime, alongside analysis of 
the use and framing of particular photographs, that it is possible to reach an understanding 
of the image of Bomber Command in public debate.
The close intertwining of the state and the press in wartime is evident in the careers of in-
dividuals such as Lord Beaverbrook (proprietor of the Daily Express and sometime Minister 
of Aircraft Production), William Surrey Dane (Managing Director of Odhams Press, before 
becoming Head of Publications at the MOI), or Freddie Gillman (a journalist with the Yorkshire 
Post then latterly a Deputy Director of Public Relations at the Air Ministry). Paul Fussell as-
serts that, ‘To read widely in the wartime correspondence exchanged by persons of high rank 
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and important position is to Ànd that about one-third of their attention is devoted to matters 
of publicity and “credit.”’118  What ties these phenomena together is the growth in impor-
tance due to conditions of war of a relatively young industry: Public Relations. This growth 
is reÁected in the establishment of the Institute for Public Relations in 1948. Arguably, anxi-
ety about the position of the press in this new terrain is exempliÀed in the establishment of 
a Royal Commission on the Press in 1946 which was to examine ‘the control, management 
and ownership of the newspaper and periodical Press and the news agencies’. The new situ-
ation postwar was given expression by Francis Williams. Prior to the war he was Editor of 
the Daily Herald. During the war he was Controller of Press Censorship and News at the MOI. 
After the war he was public relations advisor to Labour Party Prime Minister Clement Attlee. 
During which time he wrote, Press, Parliament and People, sketching the ‘new conception of 
Government Public Relations which developed during the war.’119
It is in this context that the marketing of the bombing campaign to the public was co-pro-
duced—whether by intent or by omission—through the work of individuals across a range of 
organisations including government, the military, the press and even manufacturing. MOI 
personnel shaped public perceptions of the bombing campaign through ofÀcial publications. 
The aircraft industry provided a diversionary cover story in the absence of photographs 
showing the working end of the bombing offensive, foregrounding imagery of production 
rather than destruction. Through the work of PROs in the Air Ministry News Service and oth-
er units, government efforts to manage press coverage provided attention-grabbing photo-
stories which effectively screened from public view the impact of total war.
I am not arguing that if the British public had seen the destruction they would have necessar-
ily rejected it, only that photography was a crucial part of the management of image. It is im-
portant to note, as Taylor did, that ‘if we use the media as our window on the world, we must 
be under no illusions that there are forces at work attempting to draw a curtain over it to ob-
scure our view.’120 It is hoped that ongoing collaborative and interdisciplinary research on the 
Ministry of Information, the press and Bomber Command will illuminate more brightly the 
important question of the changing nature of public relations in wartime and beyond through 
examination of the work of key bodies, such as the Air fMinistry News Service, the Press and 
Public Relations Section of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, the Photographic Section 
of the MOI Press and Censorship Division, or the Army Film and Photographic Unit.121
